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ABSTRACT
In this paper I use historical data to analyze the relationship between crises and growth in
Latin America. I calculate by how much the region’s GDP per capita has been reduced
as a consequence of the recurrence of external crises. I also analyze the determinants of
major balance of payments crises. The main conclusion is that it is unlikely that Latin
America will, on average, experience a major improvement in long run growth in the
future. It is possible that some countries will make progress in catching up with the
advanced nations. This, however, will not be the norm; most Latin American countries
are likely to fall further behind in relation to the Asian countries and other emerging
nations. Not everything, however, is grim. My analysis also suggests that fewer Latin
America countries will be subject to the type of catastrophic crises that affected the
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1I. Introduction
During the last 35 years Latin America’s economic performance has been
mediocre. Per capita GDP growth averaged 1.01% during 1970-2004; during 1982-2004
it merely averaged 0.51%; and during the first five years of the 21st century, annual per
capita GDP growth was only 0.88%. Compare this with Asia’s GDP growth per capita:
2.95% in 1970-2004; 2.99% during 1982-2004; and 2.78% during 2000-2004 (See Table
1 for some detailed comparisons).1 But low GDP growth has not been Latin America’s
only economic predicament since 1970. The region also experienced numerous balance
of payments crises that resulted in abrupt contractions in output, skyrocketing
unemployment, and major social dislocations. In addition, social conditions have not
improved in a significant way during the last three decades; poverty continues to be
widespread, and income distribution is very unequal.2 It is not an exaggeration to say
that Latin America’s modern economic history has been one of crises, modest growth,
inequality, and poverty.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s most Latin American countries embarked
on market-oriented reforms. These programs were based on efforts to reduce fiscal
imbalances and inflation, deregulate investment, reduce import restrictions and import
duties, develop domestic capital markets, and privatize public enterprises.3 These
reforms, which were known as the “Washington Consensus,” bore fruit on the
macroeconomic front. Inflation declined and credit became available to large masses of
consumers. In most countries growth accelerated in the years following the reforms, and
in some – Argentina, Chile and Peru – GDP growth increased drastically. Throughout
most of the region the first half of the 1990s was a period of hope and high expectations.4
In most countries, however, progress was short lived. The use of pegged
exchange rates to bring down inflation resulted in real exchange rate overvaluation and in
1 These numbers for “Latin America” refer to Latin America proper and exclude the Caribbean countries.
When these are included, however, the resulting rate of growth is somewhat higher, but the overall message
does not change. The Asian data refer to all of Asia. If the analysis is restricted to the so -called “Asian
Tigers”, the contrast with Latin America is even more marked.
2 See, for example, the essays in Edwards (2007b), especially Prados de la Escosura (2007). See, also,
World Bank (2003).
3 See, Williamson (1990).
4 For an analysis of the early reforms see Edwards (1995). On Latin America’s growth see Loayza et al
(2005).
2a decline in exports’ competitiveness. In addition, neither productivity growth, nor
investment rates increased sufficiently as to sustain GDP growth over the longer run.
During the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s hope was replaced by a succession
of deep and traumatic crises. In December 1994, and after a year of political upheaval
that included the Chiapas uprising and the assassination of the PRI’s presidential
candidate, the Mexican Peso collapsed and was devalued by more than 60%. The
Mexican crisis generated a wave of “contagion” through the region, testing the strength
of the reformed economies. Capital flows into Latin America declined, and the cost of
borrowing internationally (as measured by the spread paid by Latin American bonds over
and above the yield on U.S. Treasuries), increased significantly. Argentina, a country
that had chosen a fixed exchange rate regime and a currency board, was particularly
affected by what came to be known as the “tequila effect.”
By mid 1997, when the region was beginning to recover from the Mexican crisis,
the world was shocked by the eruption of severe crises throughout South East Asia.
Thailand was the first to collapse, followed by Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and
South Korea. Although Latin America had limited trade and financial exposure to South
East Asia, it was still subject to contagion. In mid 1998 the global financial system was
affected by two new crises, and contagion rippled throughout the world. In August the
Russian ruble collapsed, and in September the failure of the investment firm Long Term
Capital Management, exposed the fragilities of the global financial system. Following
these crises, capital flows to the emerging countries declined significantly, forcing many
Latin American nations to implement severe macroeconomic adjustments.5
A number of countries experienced balance of payment crises: Brazil in 1999,
Argentina in 2001, Uruguay in 2002, and the Dominican Republic in 2003. Growth
declined throughout the region, unemployment increased and social conditions
deteriorated. As a result of these economic setbacks, frustration erupted, and the public
grew increasingly skeptical about the merits of globalization and market orientation. In
election after election voters turned to the left, electing Presidents that were clearly
critical of the Washington Consensus. Although these new leaders were quite different
among themselves, they all argued that the region needed to increase spending in social
5 See Calvo (1999).
3programs, and make an effort to reduce inequality. In some countries -- Bolivia, Ecuador
and Venezuela – the new political leaders announced policies that would undo many of
the reforms of the 1990s. Some of these policies included the nationalization of
industries, and rapid increase in the extent of government controls.
In this paper I use historical data to analyze the relationship between crises and
growth in Latin America. More specifically, I calculate by how much the region’s GDP
per capita has been reduced as a consequence of the recurrence of external crises. I also
analyze the determinants of major balance of payments crises, and, at the light of these
historical results, I discuss the region’s economic future.
The main conclusion of this paper is that it is unlikely that in the future Latin
America will, on average, experience a major improvement in long run growth. It is
possible that some countries will do relatively well, and will make progress in catching
up with the advanced nations. This, however, will not be the norm; most Latin American
countries are likely to fall further behind in relation to the Asian countries and other
emerging nations. Not everything, however, is grim. My analysis also suggests that in
the years to come fewer Latin America countries will be subject to the type of
catastrophic and very costly currency crises that affected the region in the past. It is very
likely that Latin America’s future will be one of “No crises and very modest growth.”
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II I use a two-equation empirical
model to investigate the determinants of long term growth, and to analyze the way in
which recurrent external crises have affected growth dynamics. My results indicate that
external crises have been very costly for the average Latin America country: 7% of GDP
per decade. In Section III I go one step further, and I use variance component probit
models to investigate the forces behind these external crises. My findings suggest that
they have been the result of both misguided domestic policies as well as external shocks.
In Section IV I discuss the future of the Latin American economies at the light of the
results presented in the paper. Finally, in Section V I offer some concluding remarks.
The paper also has a Data Appendix.
Before proceeding further, it is important to emphasize that Latin America and the
Caribbean is a large a region, composed of over thirty diverse countries. This means that
any study that focuses on “the average” or “typical” Latin American nation will tend to
4oversimplify some important aspects of reality. On the other hand, by focusing on Latin
America as a group I am able to concentrate on some of the structural and institutional
features that are common to most countries in the region. In order to provide as much
texture as possible to the analysis, throughout the paper I make an effort to discuss a
number of country specific experiences and cases.
II. External Crises and Growth in Latin America: An Empirical Investigation
For a long time Latin America has had a reputation of being a crisis-prone region.
The first balance of payments crises erupted in the 1820s, during the early years of
Independence. Since then the Latin American currencies have been repeatedly devalued,
and debts have been repudiated on several occasions.6 Some memorable modern (post
1970) crises include the Mexican crises of 1976, 1982 and 1994; the Chilean crisis of
1982; the Brazilian crisis of 1999; the Argentine crises of 1989 and 2001, and the
Uruguayan crisis of 2002. In spite of the massive recurrence of crises during the last four
decades, there has been no effort in the literature to systematically quantify the cost – in
terms of growth or other variables -- of these episodes of acute instability.
In this Section I use a two-equation empirical model and a large cross country
data set to investigate the way in which external crises affect GDP growth. I concentrate
on two types of external crises: (a) Sudden stops of capital inflows, and (b) large current
account reversals. The data are for 1970-2004 and, for comparison purposes, cover all
countries in the world for which there is information. A sudden stop is defined as a
reduction in net capital inflows of at least 5% of GDP in one year.7 A current account
reversal, on the other hand, is defined as a reduction in the current account deficit of at
least 4% of GDP in one year (see the Data Appendix for details).8
In Table 2 I present tabulations on the incidence of sudden stops for the period
under study; Table 3 contains data on the incidence of current account reversals. In both
Tables I have considered six groups of countries – industrial, Latin America and
6 See Marichal (1989) for early episodes of external crises and currency collapses.
7 To qualify as a sudden stop episode, the country in question must have been a net importer of capital in
the previous year. In order to check for the robustness of the results, I also used two alternative definitions
of sudden stops, which considered a reduction in inflows of 3 and 7% of GDP in one year.
8 I also used an alternative definition. The qualitative nature of the results discussed below, were not
affected by the precise definition of reversals or sudden stops. See Edwards (2007).
5Caribbean, Asia, Africa, Middle East and North Africa, and Eastern Europe. Each Table
also includes a Pearson test for equality of incidence across groups of countries. As may
be seen, the total historical incidence of sudden stops has been 4.6%. Different groups of
countries, however, have experienced very different realities, with the incidence being
highest in Eastern Europe and the Middle East and lowest in the industrial nations. Table
3 indicates that the aggregate incidence of current account reversals rate has been 10.4%;
Africa and Latin America have had the highest incidence at 16% and 13% respectively,
and the industrial countries have had the lowest incidence at 2.5%.
Sudden stops and current account reversals are highly related phenomena. There
is no reason, however, for their relationship to be exactly one-to-one. Indeed, because of
changes in international reserves, it is possible that a country that suffers a sudden stop in
capital inflows does not experience at the same time a current account reversal. For the
complete sample 46.8% of countries subject to a sudden stop also faced a current account
reversal. At the same time, 22.8% of those with current account reversals also
experienced (in the same year) a sudden stop of capital inflows. For every one of the
regions, as well as for the complete sample, Pearson2 tests suggest that although there
are observed differences across these phenomena, the two are statistically related.
II.1 The Empirical Model
The point of departure of the empirical analysis is a two-equation formulation of
the dynamics of real GDP per capita growth of country j in period t. Equation (1) is a
long run GDP growth equation, similar to those estimated in the new growth empirical
literature; equation (2) captures the growth dynamics process. 9
(1) jjjjj szxg  *
(2) jtjtjtjtjjt uvggg    )( 1*
Equation (1) relates long term per capita GDP growth to structural variables ( jx ),
policy variables ( jz ), and institutional variables ( js ). The error term is assumed to be
9 This formulation is based on Edwards and Levy Yeyati (2005).
6heteroskedastic. In equation (2), jtg is the rate of growth of per capita GDP in country j
in period t. The terms jtv and jtu are shocks, assumed to have zero mean, finite variance
and to be uncorrelated among them. More specifically, jtv is assumed to be an external
terms of trade shock, while jtu captures other shocks, including sudden stops and current
account reversals. t j is an error term, which is assumed to be heteroskedastic. ,,
andare parameters that determine the particular characteristics of the growth process.
Equation (2) -- which has the form of an equilibrium correction model (ECM) --, states
that the actual rate of growth in period t will deviate from the long run rate of growth due
to the existence of three types of shocks. Over time, however, the actual rate of growth
will tend to converge towards it long run value, with the rate of convergence given by.
The main interest from the perspective of the current paper is the effect of sudden stops
and current account reversals on growth; that is, whether coefficient is significantly
negative. In the estimation of equation (2), I used dummy variables for sudden stops and
reversals.
The system (1) - (2) was estimated using a two step procedure. In the first step I
estimate the long run growth equation (1) using a cross-country data set. These first stage
estimates are then used to generate long-run predicted growth rates to replace *jg , in the
equilibrium error correction model (2), with the predicted value of long term growth. In
the second step, I estimated equation (2) using a GLS random effects procedure for
unbalanced panels.10 The data set used covers 103 countries, for the 1970-2004 period;
not every country has data for every year, however. See the Data Appendix for exact
data definition and data sources.
II.2 The Long Term Growth Equation
In estimating equation (1) for long run per capita growth, I follow the by now
standard literature on growth, as summarized by Durlauf et al (2005) and Weil (2005).
The data set covers 103 countries, and most variables are defined as averages for 1970-
2004. For some covariates, however, data are only available for a shorter period. See the
Data Appendix for details.
10 When fixed effects were used the results were very similar.
7Over long periods of time, economic growth is the result of the combination of
three fundamental factors: the accumulation of both physical capital and human capital,
improvements in the utilization of the labor force, and total factor productivity (TFP)
growth. As argued by Acemoglu et al (2005), among others, TFP growth and the
efficiency of capital accumulation depend on institutional variables, including the
protection of property rights, the independence of the judiciary, and the level of
corruption. A society where property rights are protected for the population at large will
generally devote more time and effort to innovating, accumulating capital, improving
efficiency and increasing productivity.11 In this institutional framework it is important
that property rights are protected for all citizens, and not only for the elite. In that regard,
a greater degree of democracy will tend to encourage efficiency and productivity growth
(Acemoglu et al 2005). In the same vein, a society with an independent and efficient
judiciary system will be able to solve conflicts among parties in an efficient way, without
negatively affecting the innovative process. In countries where corruption is low, the
private sector will be able to devote more time and effort to activities that generate
greater efficiency and innovation. On the contrary, in nations where the degree of
corruption is high, private sector representatives will tend to devote a significant amount
of time to bribe public sector officials and to finding ways of getting around regulations
and restrictions.
In the specification of the long run growth equation (1), the following traditional
covariates, which have been used in the standard growth literature, were included:12 (1)
the log of initial (1974) GDP per capita. (2) The ratio of gross investment to GDP, as a
proxy for the accumulation of physical capital. (3) The coverage of secondary education,
as a proxy for human capital accumulation. (4) The degree of openness of the economy
to international trade. This variable is measured as the fitted value from a gravity model
of bilateral trade.13 (5) The ratio of government consumption to GDP, as a proxy for the
size of the public sector. In addition to these standard variables, the following covariates
11 However, if property rights protection is limited to the elite, innovation and productivity growth will not
be encouraged.
12 See, for example, Durlauf et al (2005) and Weil (2005).
13 As Aizenman and Noy (2006) have shown, there is a strong empirical connection between trade
openness and the degree of capital mobility. The use of gravity trade equations to generate instruments in
panel estimation has been pioneered by Jeff Frankel. See, for example, Frankel and Cavallo (2004).
8that reflect a country’s macroeconomic policy stance and economic structure were
included: (6) Average rate of inflation over the period under study. (7) The volatility of
inflation, measured as the standard deviation of the rate of change of the CPI. (8) The
volatility of the (logarithm of the) terms of trade. And, (9) the volatility of the (bilateral)
real exchange rate index (RER).14
Finally, a set of covariates that capture the strength of a country’s institutions
were included in the estimation of equation (1) (since these variables are highly collinear,
they were introduced into the analysis one at the time): (10) An index that measures the
degree of protection of property rights. The higher the value of this index, the stronger is
the protection of property rights. (11) An index that measures the “rule of law” in each
country. A higher value of the index reflects a greater respect for the rule of law. A
limitation of this index is that it is only available since 1996. (12) An index that
measures the extent to which a country is able to “control corruption.” The source is the
ICRG; a higher value of the index means a stricter control of corrupted practices and,
thus, a lower level of corruption. (13) An index that measures the degree of “law and
order” in each country. A higher value of the index reflects a greater respect for law and
order. (14) An index that measures the degree of independence of the judiciary in each
country. As before, a higher value of the index reflects a greater degree of independence.
And, (15) an index that measures the strength of democratic institutions in each country
(See the Data Appendix for details).
The basic regressions results are in Table 4, where the z-statistics were obtained
using robust standard errors (in all of the equations regional dummy variables were also
included, but not reported).15 All of the coefficients have the expected signs and the vast
majority of them are significant at conventional levels. Moreover, the regressions in
Table 4 explain approximately two thirds of the long run cross country variability in
growth. These results support the main implications of the new theories of growth, and
confirm previous findings by a large number of authors, including Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995), Edwards (1992, 1998), Weil (2005), and the works discussed in
14 A bilateral RER rate index was used because it is available for a larger number of countries. When a
multilateral RER index was used, the results were very similar to those reported in this Section.
15
In some regressions, not reported here due to space considerations, I computed the standard errors by
clustering observations by region; the results were similar to those reported here.
9Acemoglu et al (2005) and Durlauf et al (2005). The coefficient of initial GDP per
capita is significantly negative, indicating that there is conditional convergence. The
results also indicate that both physical and human capital accumulation are important
sources of growth. Higher government consumption tends to reduce long term growth.
Higher average inflation and higher inflation volatility reduce growth, as do higher terms
of trade volatility and higher real exchange rate volatility.
The estimated coefficients of the institutional variables in Table 4 tell a robust
story. Countries with stronger institutions – economic, judicial, and political – tend to
have a better growth performance over long periods of time than countries with weak
institutions. For example, according to these results countries that are able to control
corruption better grow faster than countries unable to control corruption; likewise,
countries that have a more independent judiciary, stronger law and order, and stronger
protection of property rights grow faster than nations that have problems in these
institutional areas.16
In order to assess the relative importance of the different variables in these
regressions I computed standardized beta coefficients that measure by how much the
dependent variable changes, if the independent variables increase by one standard
deviation.17 The results obtained are quite revealing: in every regressions the institutional
variables have the highest standardized betas, confirming that the story of long term
growth differentials across countries is fundamentally – although not exclusively – a
story of weak institutions.
The results presented in Table 4 provide important clues for understanding Latin
America’s mediocre growth performance over the years. During 1970-2004 the nations
of Latin America did poorly in every one of the categories of growth determinants:
capital accumulation was very low, educational achievements lagged behind those of
other regions, inflation was very high and volatile, and institutions were very weak and
16 As a number of authors have discussed, these types of regressions have a series of limitation, including
the fact that the number of potential independent variables exceed the number of observations, and that
there are likely to be endogeneity problems. See Durlauf (2005). I used a number of these regressions
using instrumental variables. The results, however, were not very different from those reported here. More
important, there made no significant difference in the estimation of the dynamic of growth equation (2).
17 These coefficients are not reported here due to space considerations.
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inefficient (See Table A.1 in the appendix).18 An important question, and one that I
address in some detail in Section IV of this paper, refers to the way in which these
determinants of long term growth are likely to evolve in Latin America during the next
10 to 15 years.
II.3 The Growth Dynamics Equation
Table 5 presents the results from the second step estimation of the growth
dynamics equation (2). I use the fitted values from the estimates for long run GDP per
capita growth reported in equation (4.7) in Table 4 to construct a proxy for the trend rate
of growth *
jg . When alternative specifications for computing the long run growth
equation were used, the results were very similar to those reported in Table 5.19
The estimated coefficient of )( * jtj gg  is, as expected, positive, significant, and
smaller than one. The point estimates are on the high side -- between 0.74 and 0.76 --,
indicating that, on average, deviations between long run trend growth and actual growth
get eliminated rather quickly. For instance, according to equation (5.1), after 3 years
approximately 86% of a unitary shock to real GDP growth per capita will be eliminated.
As expected, the estimated coefficients of the terms of trade shock are always positive,
and statistically significant, indicating that an improvement (deterioration) in the terms of
trade results in a short run acceleration (de-acceleration) in the rate of growth of real per
capita GDP. As may be seen from equations (5.1) and (5.2), the coefficient of the current
account reversals variable is significantly negative, indicating that reversals result in a
deceleration of growth. In equation (5.1) the point estimate is -1.99; with other things
given, a current account reversal has resulted in almost a 2% reduction in short term
growth, on average. The results in equation (5.3) refer to sudden stops. They show that
the estimated coefficient of the sudden stop indicator is negative, with a point estimate –
0.80. This suggests that while sudden stops have also have a negative effect on per capita
growth, their impact on growth has not been as severe as the impact of current account
reversal episodes.
The results in equation (5.2), where both the current account reversals and the
sudden stop dummies are included, are particularly interesting: while the reversal
18 See, for example, Edwards (1995) and Naim (1994).
19 They are available on request.
11
dummy continue to be significantly negative, the coefficient for the sudden stop dummy
is not significant. This suggests that what is costly – in terms of lower GDP per capita
growth – is not a sudden stop per se; what reduces growth is the adjustment that
accompanies a current account reversal. This is an important finding, since it suggests
that countries that experience a sudden stop, but are able to avoid – through the de-
accumulation of international reserves – an abrupt and major adjustment in their current
account will not face a significant decline in growth.20
Table 6 contains results from the estimation of equation (2) for the Latin
American and Caribbean countries only. At a general level these estimates are similar to
those for the complete sample: all coefficients are significant and have the expected
signs. There are however, two important differences: first, the coefficient of the growth
gap )( * jtj gg  is much smaller for the Latin American nations, indicating that deviations
of short term growth from trend growth take longer to be eliminated. Second, and more
important, the point estimates of the reversal and sudden stop variables are significantly
higher for the Latin American countries than for the complete sample. For instance,
according to equation (6.1) abrupt and large current account reversals have been
associated, on average, with a contemporaneous decline in real per capita GDP growth of
3.6%.
The estimates in Tables 5 and 6 were obtained when the current account reversal
and sudden stop variables were introduced contemporaneously into the growth dynamics
regressions. When lagged values of these indicators were added to these regressions,
their coefficients were not significantly different from zero.
II.4 Extensions and Robustness
I performed standard robustness tests. These included estimating the equations
for alternative time periods, and alternative data sets. I also considered alternative
specifications, and included additional variables that (potentially) capture other external
shocks. In order to deal with possible endogeneity problems I estimated the dynamic of
growth equation using a simultaneous equations procedure.
(A) Alternative Samples: I estimated equation (2) for the dynamics of growth for
alternative time periods and groups of countries. The results obtained were very similar
20 In Subsection II.4 I address issues related to (potential) endogeneity.
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to those presented above, and confirm that both current account reversals and sudden
stops have been costly in terms of lower rates of growth: for the complete sample the
point estimate of the current account reversal was in the vicinity of -2.0; for the Latin
American sample it was approximately -3.5.
(B) Additional External Shocks: In the basic regressions presented in Tables 5
and 6 I only included two shocks’ covariates: external crises and terms of trade shocks. It
is possible, of course, that other shocks affect GDP’s growth dynamic. In Table 7 I
report growth regression results when two additional shocks are included: (a) a dummy
that takes the value of one if during that year the country has been at war, and zero
otherwise (See the Data Appendix for details and data sources). And (b) a global
financial shock, defined as the deviation of U.S. real interest rates from its long term
average (See the Data Appendix). As may be seen, the coefficients of the two new
shocks are negative as expected. They are significantly so for the complete sample
(equation 7.1); interestingly, for the complete sample the estimated coefficient of current
account reversals is larger, in absolute terms, than that of wars.21 This puts in context the
magnitude of the costs associated with external sector crises. Notice that for Latin
America (equation 7.2), the coefficient of the wars dummy is negative but not significant.
More important for this paper, the estimated coefficient of the current account reversal is
not affected in a significant way by this alternative specification.
(C) Endogeneity: A possible shortcoming of the results presented in Tables 5 and
6 above is that they may subject to an endogeneity bias. In order to investigate this
possibility I re-estimated equation (2) using the two-step procedure suggested by
Maddala (1983) and Keshk (2003) for systems where one of the endogenous variables is
dichotomous. 22 The results obtained, are reported in Tables 8 both for the complete
sample and the Latin American countries only. In the estimation the following
instruments were used: contemporaneous and one period lagged terms of trade changes;
the proportion of countries in each region (excluding the country in question) subject to a
sudden and large decline of net capital inflows, lagged one period; world real interest
rates lagged one and two periods; and a two-period lagged dummy that takes the value of
21 Notice, however, that there may be a potential endogenity problem with the wars variable. See the
discussion below and the results on Table 8 that tackle potential endogeneity issues.
22 See also Heckman (1978) and Amemiya (1978).
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one if there was a war in the country’s territory. As may be seen from Table 8 the main
results reported above are confirmed: external crises, and in particular, current account
reversals, have been very costly in the world in general (equation 8.1), and in Latin
America in particular (equation 8.2). Indeed, the point estimates of the current account
reversals’ coefficient are quite similar to those reported in Tables 5 and 6.
III. What Determines External Crises?
The results in Section II may be summarized as follows: (a) Long term growth is
the result of four broadly defined forces: capital accumulation (both physical and human),
policies that promote stability and efficiency, structural variables, and the strength of
institutions. And (b), external crises have been extremely costly in Latin America (and
other regions, for that matter), and have resulted in significant reductions in GDP growth
rates, relative to their long term trend. In light of these results, a natural follow-up
question is: What are the determinants of external crises? Why are some countries more
prone to experiencing sudden stops and current account reversals than others? These
questions are addressed in this Section, where I estimate a series of variance component
probit regressions on the probability of external crises.
III.1 The Empirical Model
Consider the following variance component probit model for the probability of a
sudden stop or current account reversal crisis:
1, if ,0* tjy
(3) tjy =
0, otherwise.
(4) *tjy = tjtj   .
Variable tjy is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if country j in period t
experienced a current account reversal (or a sudden stop), and zero if the country in
14
question did not experience a crises. According to equation (3), whether the country
experiences a crisis is assumed to be the result of an unobserved latent variable *tjy .
*
tjy ,
in turn, is assumed to depend linearly on vector tj . The error term tj is given by a
variance component model: .tjjtj   j is iid with zero mean and variance 2 ;
tj is normally distributed with zero mean and variance 12  . In addition to the
random effects model, I also estimated fixed effects versions of the model in equations
(3) and (4).
One of the advantages of probit models is that they are highly non-linear; the
marginal effect of any independent variable on the probability is conditional on the
values of all covariates. This means that if the value of one of the independent variables
changes, the marginal effect of all of them will also change. Denoting the (normal)
cumulative probability distribution by , then the probit model is defined by:
(5) )()|0Pr( jtjtjty  
The marginal effect of a particular variable 1z on the probability may be calculated as the
slope of the probability function, evaluated at a specific set of values of the covariates
sjt . Assume that the estimated probit coefficient of 1z is 1, and that we want to
evaluate the marginal effect of 1z at a point where covariates have values captured by
vector ~ . In this case, the marginal effect of 1z (evaluated at ~ ) is given by:
(6) .)~(' 1
1



z
Equation (4) may be used to evaluate how a change in particular variable – a “large”
current account deficit, say – affects the probability of a crisis, under alternative values
of~ .
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III.2 Specification
In determining the specification of this probit model I followed the literature on
external crises, devaluations, sudden stops, and current account reversals.23 In the base-
case specification I included the following covariates, all of which are available for a
large number of countries and years:24
 The ratio of the current account deficit to GDP, lagged one period.
 The lagged ratio of the country’s fiscal deficit relative to GDP.
 The country’s net international investment position relative to GDP. This
indicator measures the difference between foreign assets held by nationals
(government and private sector) and domestic assets held by foreigners,
relative to GDP. A negative number indicates that the country in question has
a negative net external position, or in common language is a “net debtor.”
This indicator was constructed from data provided by Lane and Milesi-Ferreti
(2006). The coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative in the
estimation of the probit equations.
 The lagged value of an index that measures the effect of “contagion.” This
contagion index is defined as the relative occurrence of capital flow
contractions in each country’s “reference group.” The reference group, in turn,
is defined for most countries as their region. There are five geographical
regions: Latin America, Asia, North Africa and the Middle East, Africa and
Eastern and Central Europe; the advanced countries belong to a group of their
own. The contagion variable is calculated, for each year, as the percentage of
countries, in the relevant group, that experienced a contraction in net capital
inflows of at least 3% of GDP. In this calculation data for the country in
question are excluded. The coefficient of this “contagion” variable in the
probit equation is expected to be positive, reflecting the fact that when a
23 See, for example, Calvo et al (2004), Glick and Hutchison (2005), Edwards (2004a, 2004b), and Frankel
and Cavallo (2004). See also Eichengreen et al (2006).
24 See, for example, Frankel and Rose (1996), Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (2000) and Edwards (2002).
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similar country experiences a capital flow contraction, capital flows to the
country in question will tend to decline, increasing the likelihood of a crisis.25
 Percentage change in the terms of trade (defined as the ratio of export prices
to import prices), with a one year lag. Improved terms of trade are expected
to lower the probability of a crisis; its coefficient should be negative.
 Lagged international real interest rates, proxied by real U.S. 10 year
Treasuries. As Eichengreen (2001) has argued, a decline in world liquidity –
captured by higher international real interest rates – will tend to increase the
probability of an external crisis. If this is indeed the case, the coefficient of
this variable will be positive.
 A dummy variable that takes the value of one if that particular country has a
flexible exchange rate regime, and zero otherwise. The classification of
exchange rate regimes is based on de facto information, as compiled by Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003).
 Foreign direct investment (FDI) relative to GDP. This variable measures the
composition of capital inflows. To the extent that FDI represents a longer
term commitment than portfolio capital flows, it is expected that its coefficient
will be negative.
 A measure of the degree of ease/tightness of monetary policy, lagged one
year. This variable is calculated as the difference between the rate of growth
of domestic credit and nominal GDP (lagged one period). The higher (lower)
the value of this variable, the easier (tighter) is monetary policy.
 International reserves as a proportion of the country’s total external liabilities.
This indicator was constructed from data provided by Lane and Milesi-Ferreti
(2006). To the extent that a high level of international reserves is seen as an
insurance policy, the coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative in
the estimation of the probit equations.
25 As before, there are six groups. Five of them are strictly regional – Latin America, Asia, Middle East
and North Africa, Eastern and Central Europe, and Africa --, while the sixth refers to “advanced” nations
and, thus, covers more than a region.
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III.3 Results
The basic results are in Tables 9 and 10, for current account reversals and sudden
stops respectively. As may be seen, most estimated coefficients are significant at
conventional levels, and the vast majority has the expected sign.
These estimates indicate that a higher current account deficit increases the
probability of a crisis. Higher fiscal deficits increase the probability of a crisis, and
higher net external assets reduce this probability. The results also confirm the presence
of a “contagion” effect, and indicate that an improvement in the terms of trade reduces
the probability of both a reversal and a sudden stop. Improvements in the terms of trade
reduce the probability, while an increase in world (real) interest rates decreases the
likelihood of a crisis.
These results show that countries with a flexible exchange rate regime have a
lower probability of experiencing a current account reversal or a sudden stop. The
regressions in Tables 9-10 also indicate that the composition of capital flows matter:
higher FDI (as a proportion of GDP) reduces the probability of a crisis. Interestingly, a
higher stock of international reserves does not reduce the likelihood of experiencing a
crisis.
In order to gain further insights into the way in which the different covariates
affect the probability of a crisis, I computed marginal effects of the different variables,
and I evaluated them for different values of the covariates vector. Four results stand up
from this exercise:26
 Most of the marginal effects are quite small.
 The largest marginal effect (in absolute terms) corresponds to the flexible
exchange rate variable. For the average country, moving from a pegged to a
flexible exchange rate reduces the probability of a crisis between 2 and 4
percentage points.
 The marginal effect of contagion varies according to the value of the current
account deficit. The higher the deficit, the higher the marginal effect of
contagion.
26 These marginal effects are not reported here due to space considerations. They are available on request.
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 The marginal effect of flexible rates becomes more negative – that is, the
benefit of adopting a flexible rate increases --, for larger current account
deficits.
The estimation results reported in Tables 8 and 9 help explain why Latin America
has been so prone to crises. As is pointed out in Section IV of this paper, until very
recently, most countries of the Latin American region had done very poorly in most
determinants of external crises: current account and fiscal deficits were very high, FDI
was low, monetary policy was loose, and the majority of countries had (and defended)
pegged nominal exchange rates (See Table 11).
IV. Reflections on Latin America’s Future
The analysis presented in the preceding Sections has identified the most important
factors that affect economic growth, and the variables that determine the probability of a
country experiencing current account reversals and sudden stops of capital inflows. At
the light of these results, an important question refers to Latin America’s economic
future: Is the region likely to continue suffering recurrent crises and mediocre growth?
Or, on the contrary, will things change for the better, with growth picking up, and crises
subsiding?
I first discuss long term growth: In spite of the reforms implemented in the
1990s, most Latin American countries have failed to make significant progress in most
areas that, according to academic research (including the results in Section II of this
paper), affect long term growth. In fact, improvements have only been achieved in three
areas: (a) macroeconomic instability has declined (i.e. inflation has declined and has
become less volatile); (b) the extent of democracy has improved; and (c) openness to
international trade has increased. From a comparative perspective, however, the Latin
American countries continue to lag behind the Asian and advanced nations with respect
to both macroeconomic stability and openness (See the data in Table A.1).
What is troublesome is that there has been very little or no progress on the other –
and, as it turns out, more important -- determinants of long term growth. The rate of
investment has not increased since the early 2000s (in fact it is almost the same as in the
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1970s); human capital accumulation – measured by the quality of education -- continues
to be deplorable; and the quality of institutions is low and has not exhibit significant
improvements. Moreover, according to a new data set on objectively measured indicators
of efficiency, collected by the World Bank, the vast majority of the Latin American
countries do very poorly in variable such as the number of days it takes to start a
business, the efficiency of bankruptcy procedures, flexibility of employment, number of
shareholders suits, and red tape for exporting, among others (See,
www.doingbusiness.org).27
The low quality of Latin America’s educational system deserves especial attention
in any discussion on prospects for long term growth. According to a number of
international studies the Latin American countries are at the bottom of the world when it
comes to education – and in particular when it comes to mathematics and science. For
instance, according to the PISA tests administered by the OECD in 2003, Brazilian
students ranked last in mathematics, among 40 countries. In the same tests Mexico was
in the 37th position and Uruguay, the best ranked Latin American country, came in 35th
out of 40 countries. The Latin American students did particularly poorly in the “problem
solving” part of these tests. This reflects the old-fashioned nature of the region’s
educational systems, where memorizing and learning by heart are still emphasized.
Sadly, results are not much better in reading ability; again, the Latin America nations
were at the bottom of the 40 country sample.28 According to the prestigious Trends in
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), in 2003 Chile’s eighth graders
ranked 39th out of 44 nations in mathematics; in science they did only slightly better,
ranking 37th. Interestingly, many of the nations that performed better than Chile in these
standardized tests have a lower income per capita. Latin American universities don’t do
any better. According to The Times of London 2004 survey, not a single Latin American
university is ranked among the top 200 in the world. This contrasts sharply with China
and India, two countries with several world class universities, especially in science and
27 A possible objection of the results in table 4 is that the institutional variables are measured as “subjective
indexes.” The Doing Business data are objective, in the sense that they use actual measures on the cost of
doing business in different countries. These Doing Business data are available for a few years only, and
thus cannot be used in time series or panel regressions.
28 See, www.pisa.oecd.org
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engineering. Thailand, Turkey, and Singapore also have first rate universities in the
sciences, including biotechnology.
This discussion suggests that for long term growth to take off in the years to
come, the Latin American nations will need to make significant progress in almost every
area that affects economic performance. In particular, very significant improvements will
need to be achieved in the area of institutional strength (remember that the standardized
coefficients analysis discussed in Section II indicate that institutional strength is the
single most important determinant of long term growth). In my view, however, it is
unlikely that this will happen across the board. Indeed, the fact that the vast majority of
the countries in the region have failed to move forward in these areas during the last 20
years, suggests that there is very little political will to tackle these impediments to
growth. Moreover, recent elections of populist or quasi-populist Presidents in an
increasingly large number of countries suggests that in some nations there is likely to be
some backtracking on the basic (and mild) reforms of the 1990s; indeed, the political
landscape of the region suggests that the road ahead doesn’t look very auspicious when it
comes either to economic or institutional reforms. Of course, economic performance also
affects politics. The fact that growth (and employment creation) has been so mediocre
since the early 1990s explains, at least partially, why Latin American voters have elected
populist politicians during the last few years.
In my view, the most likely scenario in the next 10 to 15 years is one where Latin
America, as a group, slowly falls further behind other regions in the world – Asia and
Eastern Europe – in terms of efficiency, quality of education, and institutional strength.
The result of this, of course, is that growth itself will very likely continue to be mediocre.
And, if growth remains low, the creation of well paying jobs will continue to lag behind,
and social conditions will not improve significantly.
This doesn’t mean, of course, that every country in the region will struggle and
retrogress. Indeed, it is highly likely that a handful of nations – Chile, the Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, among others – will be able to press forward with further reforms
and institutional strengthening, and in this way they will be able to move further towards
prosperity. This, however, is likely to be the exception rather than the norm.
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I now turn to the determinants of external crises. In contrast with long term
growth, almost every country in the Latin American region has made dramatic progress
in this area. Current account deficits have declined significantly, fiscal imbalances have
been reduced, the net external position has improved, monetary policy has become
restrained, and the majority of the countries have adopted flexible exchange rates. Table
11 shows the evolution between 1984 and 2004 of some of the most important variables
that determine the probability of experiencing an external crisis
The evolution of these indicators suggests quite clearly that the probability of
crises – either current account reversals or sudden stops – has declined sharply. To the
extent that progress in these areas is maintained in the years to come – and I believe that
it will be maintained – the likelihood that a “typical” Latin American country will
experience in the future a major external collapse, similar to the Mexican crisis of 1994-
95, or the Argentine crisis of 2001, is very low.
This decline in the probability of experiencing a crisis has very important
implications for the region’s economic well being. Indeed, the regressions in Section II
indicate that, on average, and with other things given, each current account reversal crisis
in Latin America reduced growth by 3.6 percentage points in that same year. Over a
generation, the accumulated difference in GDP per capita between a country that has no
crises and one that has 1.3 crises per decade can be very substantial (1.3 crises per decade
is the average for the region for 1970-2004). The actual long run gap between GDP per
capita in a no-crises country and GDP per capita in a crises country will depend on the
trend rate of growth itself, and the number of current account reversal crises experience
by the country in question. As an illustration, consider the case of a country with a long
run trend growth rate of GDP per capita of 1%, and 1.3 external crises per decade. The
accumulated cost, in terms of GDP per capita for a generation is 16% of GDP. That is,
after 25 years the “typical country” will have a GDP per capita 16% lower than that of a
country with no crises. See Figure 1 for simulation results; I have assumed that there are
no crises during the first ten years. As may be seen from this Figure, after 25 years (a
generation) the gap in GDP per capita between a country with no crises and the “typical”
country is very substantial.
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V. Concluding Remarks
In this paper I have used historical data to analyze the relationship between crises
and growth in Latin America. I used econometric estimates to calculate by how much the
region’s GDP per capita has been reduced as a consequence of the recurrence of external
crises. I also used variance component probit models to analyze the determinants of
major balance of payments crises. At the light of these historical results, I discussed the
region’s economic future.
The main conclusion of this paper is that it is unlikely that in the future – by this I
mean next decade and a half, or so -- Latin America will, on average, experience a major
improvement in long run growth. The reason for this is that most countries in the region
show no political willingness to embark on the reforms required to strengthen their
institutions – including, in particular, the protection of property rights, the rule of law,
corruption controls and the efficiency and independence of the judiciary. In fact, the
recent election of populist Presidents in a number of countries suggests that the region
has no political appetite for further efficiency-enhancing and institutional-strengthening
reforms. Indeed, a number of new leaders have indicated that they will undo many of the
reforms that were undertaken during the 1990s.
Backtracking and lack of reforms will not be universal. It is possible, of course,
that some countries will do relatively well, and will make progress in catching up with
the advanced nations – Chile and El Salvador are particularly promising cases. This,
however, will not be the norm; most Latin American countries are likely to fall further
behind in relation to the Asian countries and other emerging nations.
Not everything, however, is grim. The econometric analysis presented in this
paper also suggests that in the years to come fewer Latin America countries will be
subject to the type of catastrophic and very costly currency crises that affected the region
in the past. These crises cost the Latin American countries close to 16% of GDP over a
generation. In recent years, most nations have greatly improved their macroeconomic
policies. External debts have declined, current account and fiscal deficits are in check,
FDI has increased, monetary policy has been restrained, and most nations have adopted
some version of flexible exchange rates. Every one of these measures has reduced the
likelihood of major crises.
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Once these results on long term growth and crises are put together a simple, and
yet powerful, conclusion emerges: it is very likely that Latin America’s future will be one
of “No crises, and modest growth.”
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Figure 1: GDP per capita Simulations, with and without current account reversal crises
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Table 1
Per Capita GDP Growth in Latin America, 1970-2004:
A Comparative Perspective*
1970-2004 1982-2004 2000-2004
Latin America and Caribbean 1.48 1.10 1.08
Latin America 1.01 0.51 0.88
Asia 2.95 2.99 2.78
Asian Tigers + China + India 4.93 4.81 4.40
Asian Tigers 4.83 4.44 3.69
World 1.76 1.54 2.50
Industrialized Countries 2.29 1.97 1.80
*:Cross-Country Average per capita GDP growth. For sources, see Data Appendix.
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Table 2
Incidence of Sudden Stops, 1970-2004
No sudden stop Sudden stop
Industrial Countries 96.23 3.77
Latin American and Caribbean 95.62 4.38
Asia 97.74 2.26
Africa 94.61 5.39
Middle East 92.16 7.84
Eastern Europe 92.31 7.69
Total 95.45 4.55
Observations 2240
Pearson
Uncorrected chi2 (5) 10.073
Design-based F(5, 11195) 2.014
P-value 0.073
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Table 3
Incidence of Current Account Reversals, 1970-2004
No Reversal Reversal
Industrial Countries 97.54 2.46
Latin American and Caribbean 86.86 13.14
Asia 91.70 8.30
Africa 83.82 16.18
Middle East 86.93 13.07
Eastern Europe 92.31 7.69
Total 89.64 10.36
Observations 2240
Pearson
Uncorrected chi2 (5) 70.692
Design-based F(5, 11195) 14.132
P-value 0.000
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Table4
Long Term Growth Equations, 1970-2004
EQ.1 EQ.2 EQ.3 EQ.4 EQ.5 EQ.6 EQ.7 EQ.8 EQ.9 EQ.10
Initial GDP -0.6067 -0.5195 -0.6929 -0.6308 -0.7492 -0.6837 -0.7452 -0.7941 -0.4824 -0.5347
(-4.89) *** (-3.87) *** (-5.88) *** (-5.3) *** (-6.77) *** (-5.97) *** (-5.86) *** (-5.62) *** (-3.9) *** (-4.6) ***
Gov. Con. / GDP -1.9776 -1.6436 -1.2147 -1.1566 -0.9665 -2.1869 -1.8135 -1.5903 1.1823 0.5369
(-1.56) (-1.67) * (-1.12) (-1.16) (-1.04) (-1.73) * (-1.79) * (-1.55) (1.07) (0.6)
Gross Inv. / GDP 0.0948 0.0951 0.0693 0.0813 0.0630 0.0799 0.0712 0.0889 0.1052 0.0963
(2.16) ** (2.22) ** (1.48) (1.77) * (1.35) (1.9) * (1.71) * (2.15) ** (2.35) ** (2.21) **
Secondary Education 2.5631 1.0528 1.6628 1.5416 2.2043 1.7256 0.7560 0.8292 2.0959 2.5515
(3.02) *** (1.3) (1.67) * (1.62) (2.46) ** (2.24) ** (1.02) (0.93) (2.53) ** (3.07) ***
Openness 0.0169 0.0122 0.0091 0.0229 0.0131 0.0146 0.0108 0.0083 0.0171 0.0156
(2.63) *** (2.26) ** (1.53) (1.56) (2.11) ** (2.38) ** (1.87) * (1.46) (2.6) ** (2.44) **
Terms of Trade Volatility -- -0.0973 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
(-4.35) ***
Corruption -- -- 0.3024 -- -- -- -- -- -- --
(1.79) *
Democracy -- -- -- 0.1015 -- -- -- -- -- --
(2.72) ***
Judiciary Independence -- -- -- -- 0.2013 -- -- -- -- --
(2.21) **
Law and Order -- -- -- -- -- 0.2348 -- -- -- --
(2.17) **
Property Rights -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.5056 -- -- --
(4.12) ***
Rule of Law -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.0493 -- --
(3.72) ***
Inflation -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.0044 --
(-2.7) ***
RER Volatility -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -1.2873
(-2.15) **
Inflation Volatility -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.0009
(-1.78) *
R-2 0.5847 0.672 0.6291 0.6097 0.6394 0.6231 0.6587 0.6552 0.5981 0.611
Number Observations 103 100 92 94 86 97 98 103 101 101
Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Regional dummy variables included, but not reported. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *
significant at 10%. See the text for details.
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Table 5
The Dynamics of Growth, 1970-2004:
GLS, Random Effects Estimates
Eq. 5.1 Eq. 5.2 Eq. 5.3
Growth Gap 0.756 0.751 0.743
(26.04) *** (25.14) *** (24.62) ***
Change in Terms of Trade 0.087 0.089 0.082
(11.36) *** (11.72) *** (10.86) ***
Reversal -1.997 -2.059 ..
(-5.47) *** (-5.56) ***
Sudden Stop .. -0.132 -0.805
(-0.26) (-1.95)*
R-squared
whitin 0.4750 0.4764 0.4606
between 0.0775 0.0229 0.0170
overall 0.4441 0.4443 0.4307
Number of observations 2342 2240 2241
Number of groups 94 92 93
Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *
significant at 10%.
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Table 6
The Dynamics of Growth in Latin America, 1970-2004:
GLS, Random Effects Estimates
Eq 6.1 Eq 6.2 Eq 6.3
Growth Gap 0.679 0.685 0.654
(11.85) *** (11.95) *** (10.83) ***
Change in Terms of Trade 0.095 0.095 0.080
(6.56) *** (6.11) *** (5.08) ***
Reversal -3.601 -3.394 ..
(-5.84) *** (-5.28) ***
Sudden Stop .. -1.624 -2.806
(-1.63) (-2.72) ***
R-squared
whitin 0.4320 0.4375 0.3920
between 0.0222 0.0151 0.0173
overall 0.4206 0.4241 0.3780
Number of observations 557 548 548
Number of groups 20 20 20
Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *
significant at 10%.
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Table 7
The Dynamics of Growth, 1970-2004:
Additional Shock
(GLS, Random Effects Estimates)
Eq 7.1
(Complete
Sample)
Eq. 7.2
(Latin
America)
Growth Gap 0.765 0.715
(26.22) *** (12.41) ***
Change in Terms of Trade 0.085 0.090
(11.26) *** (6.51) ***
Reversal -1.936 -3.535
(-5.37) *** (-5.59) ***
Deviation of World Real Interest -0.155 -0.354
(-3.73) *** (-3.51) ***
War Dummy -0.428 -0.347
(-2.24) ** (-0.75)
R-squared
within 0.4794 0.4547
between 0.1877 0.0089
overall 0.4478 0.4420
Number of observations 2341 557
Number of groups 94 20
Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *
significant at 10%.
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Table 8
The Dynamics of Growth, 1970-2004:
Two-Steps Maddala Procedure
Eq 8.1
(Complete
Sample)
Eq. 8.2
(Latin
America)
Growth Gap 0.773 0.831
(32.2) *** (8.66) ***
Change in Terms of Trade 0.114 0.173
(11.26) *** (4.51) ***
Reversal -1.709 -4.273
(-4.16) *** (-2.76) ***
R square 0.4317 0.3913
Adjusted R square 0.4309 0.3878
Pseudo R square from Probit 0.0687 0.0772
Number of observations 2171 530
Corrected t statistics are reported in parentheses. For list of instruments, see the text. *** significant
at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
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Table 9
Variance Component Probit on the Probability of a Current Account Reversal,
1970-2004
Eq. 9.1 Eq. 9.2 Eq. 9.3 Eq. 9.4 Eq. 9.5
Contagion 0.009 0.012 0.010 0.012 0.010
(2.33) ** (2.95) *** (2.6) *** (3.05) *** (2.36) **
Change in Terms Of Trade 0.008 0.020 0.006 0.007 0.009
(4.78) *** (6.89) *** (3.54) *** (3.64) *** (5.03) ***
Exchange Rate Regime -0.127 -0.288 -0.274 -0.194 -0.194
(-1.27) (-2.79) *** (-2.82) *** (-1.83) * (-1.72) *
World (Real) Interest Rates 0.039 0.021 0.036 .. ..
(2) ** (1.02) (1.87) *
Domestic Credit 0.003 0.002 0.003
(2.11) ** (1.26) (2.21) **
Current Account 0.092 .. .. 0.100 0.131
(15.49) *** (14.07) *** (13.78) ***
Fiscal Deficits .. 0.026 .. .. ..
(3.37) ***
Net External Assets .. .. -0.004 .. ..
(-6.31) ***
International Reserves .. .. .. 0.001 --
(0.24)
FDI (Proportion of GDP) .. .. .. .. -0.065
(-6.33) ***
 0.3116 0.3700 0.2743 0.3500 0.4515
 0.0885 0.1204 0.0700 0.1091 0.1693
Likelihood-ratio test of=0
(p - value)
Number of observations 2615 2023 2314 2385 2353
Number of groups 146 129 124 124 120
Absolute value of z statistics is reported in parentheses. All repressors are one period lagged.
Constant term is included, but not reported. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant
at 10%.is/(+ 1).
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Table 10
Variance Component Probit on the Probability of a Sudden Stop, 1970-2004
Eq. 9.1 Eq. 9.2 Eq. 9.3 Eq. 9.4 Eq. 9.5
Contagion 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.003
(1.64) * (1.15) (1.63)* (0.86) (0.59)
Change in Terms Of Trade 0.009 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004
(2.38) ** (1.27) (1.82)* (1.73) * (2.1) **
Exchange Rate Regime -0.243 -0.203 -0.188 -0.141 -0.136
(-1.78) * (-1.65)* (-1.67)* (-1.07) (-1.01)
World (Real) Interest Rates 0.031 0.024 -- .. ..
(1.11) (0.95)
Domestic Credit 0.002 0.000 -- .. ..
(1.29) (0.22)
Current Account .. .. 0.058 0.060 0.070
(10.11)*** (8.95) *** (8.79) ***
Fiscal Deficits 0.0160 .. -- .. ..
(1.71) *
Net External Assets .. -0.0024 -- .. ..
(-3.25) ***
International Reserves .. .. -- 0.004 0.005
(1.61) (1.98) **
FDI (Proportion of GDP) .. .. -- .. -0.023
(-2.62) ***
 0.3972 0.4171 0.330 0.3535 0.3914
 0.1363 0.1482 0.125 0.1111 0.1328
Likelihood-ratio test of=0
(p - value)
Number of Observations 2015 2301 2626 2372 2340
Number of Groups 129 124 147 124 120
Absolute value of z statistics is reported in parentheses. All repressors are one period lagged.
Constant term is included, but not reported. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant
at 10%.is/(+ 1).
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Table 11
Evolution of Crises Determinants in Latin America, 1984-1994
1984 1994 2004
Current account deficit to GDP 4.9% 5.4% 1.1%
NIIP over GDP -56.5% -58.8% -50.5%
Fiscal deficit to GDP 8.7% 2.2% 1.1%
Percentage flexible exchange rates 21.0% 31.6% 41.0%
FDI to GDP 0.3% 3.0% 3.2%
Contagion frequency 25.0% 18.0% 15.0%
Excess supply of credit 6.8% 3.4% -1.7%
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DATA APPENDIX
A.1 Means of Long Term Determinants of Growth (1970-2004)*
Industrial
Countries
Latin America
&
Caribbean
Asia Africa Middle East Eastern Europe
Gov. Con. / GDP 0.102 0.346 0.146 0.178 0.157 0.406
(0.05) (0.28) (0.03) (0.11) (0.10) (0.26)
Gross Inv. / GDP 23.645 21.243 25.654 19.408 24.320 23.984
(2.86) (3.16) (6.40) (5.72) (3.73) (4.12)
Secondary Education 0.788 0.401 0.365 0.138 0.455 0.550
(0.12) (0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.19) (0.23)
Openness 6.612 5.859 15.525 5.724 14.458 2.966
(11.48) (6.44) (31.18) (6.74) (9.03) (2.55)
Terms of Trade Volatility 6.136 14.245 12.663 19.255 17.444 8.935
(2.09) (4.51) (5.40) (8.53) (8.28) (0.47)
Democracy 8.865 3.655 2.841 -1.395 1.019 4.495
(2.77) (4.85) (2.61) (5.29) (5.11) (3.01)
Judiciary Independence 7.849 3.359 5.013 4.341 6.310 5.167
(1.21) (1.88) (1.74) (1.52) (1.48) (0.87)
Law and Order 9.190 4.664 6.004 4.704 7.404 7.056
(1.04) (1.33) (1.94) (1.98) (0.80) (0.34)
Property Rights 7.798 4.368 5.022 4.176 5.575 5.850
(0.82) (1.09) (1.56) (1.09) (0.89) (1.04)
Rule of Law 1.660 -0.204 0.154 -0.572 0.521 0.465
(0.42) (0.59) (0.88) (0.53) (0.62) (0.38)
Inflation 6.732 124.513 7.648 17.760 12.302 34.118
(4.16) (221.43) (2.92) (15.03) (15.01) (19.61)
Inflation Volatility 5.106 338.825 6.080 16.960 14.924 45.962
(3.86) (683.21) (2.32) (15.32) (25.57) (48.81)
*: The figures are means for 1970-2004, or for the longest period for which there are available data.
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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A.2 Data definitions and sources
Variable Description Source
Consumer Price Index
(CPI)
Consumer Price Index World Development Indicators
Contagion Relative occurrence of capital flow
contractions in each country’s “reference
group.”
Author’s construction based on
data of financial account (World
Development Indicators)
Corruption Corruption index in the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG)
Political Risk Services
Current Account Current Account World Development Indicators
Degree of Openness Fitted value from a gravity model of bilateral
trade
Author’s construction.
Deviation of U.S. Real
Interest Rate
U.S. Real Interest Rate minus U.S. Real
Interest Rate average 1970 -2004
Author’s construction
Direct Foreign
Investment
Direct Foreign Investment World Development Indicators
Ease/Tightness of
Monetary Policy
Difference between the rate of growth of
nominal domestic credit and nominal GDP.
Author’s construction.
Exchange Rate Regime Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger de facto
exchange rate regimes classification
Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger
(2003)
External Liabilities External Liabilities Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2006)
Fiscal Deficit Fiscal Deficit World Development Indicators
Government
Consumption
Government Consumption World Development Indicators
Gross Domestic
Product (GDP)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) World Development Indicators
Independence of
Judiciary System
Judiciary Independence Economic Freedom of the World
2006 Annual Report
Inflation Annual change in CPI Author’s construction.
International
Investment Position
Difference between foreign assets held by
nationals government and private sector) and
domestic assets held by foreigners
Author’s construction usingdata
from Lane and Milesi-Ferreti
(2006).
International Reserves International Reserves Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2006)
Investment Investment World Development Indicators
Law and Order Law and Order Economic Freedom of the World
2006 Annual Report
Net Capital Inflow Net Capital Inflow World Development Indicators
Nominal Domestic
Credit
Nominal Domestic Credit World Development Indicators
Nominal GDP Nominal GDP World Development Indicators
Protection of Property
Rights
Legal System & Property Rights Economic Freedom of the World
2006 Annual Report
Real Exchange Rate
(RER)
Real Exchange Rate (RER) World Development Indicators
Reversal Reduction in the current account deficit of at
least 4% of GDP in one year. Initial balance
has to be indeed a deficit.
Author’s construction based on
data of current account deficit
(World Development Indicators)
Rule of Law Rule of Law Worldwide Governance
Indicators, World Bank
Secondary Education Total gross enrollment ratio for secondary
education.
Barro and Lee (2001)
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Strength of Democratic
Institutions
DEMOC: general openness of political
institutions
Polity IV Project database
Sudden Stop Reduction of net capital inflows of at least 5%
of GDP in one year. The country in question
must have received an inflow of capital larger
to its region’s third quartile during the
previous two years prior to the “sudden stop.”
Author’s construction based on
data of financial account (World
Development Indicators)
Terms of Trade Trade-exports as capacity to import (constant
local currency units)
World Development Indicators
U.S. Real Interest Rate Treasury Bill minus inflation International Monetary Fund
Volatility Inflation Standard deviation of the rate of change of the
CPI.
Author’s construction.
Volatility RER Standard deviation of the rate of change of
the RER
Author’s construction.
Volatility Terms of
Trade
Standard deviation of the rate of change of
the Terms of trade
Author’s construction.
War Dummy Dummy = 1 if country participate in a any
type of conlict during the year. 0 otherwise.
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts
Dataset
World Interest Rate U.S. Real Interest Rate International Monetary Fund
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